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Author Topic: Alaska 261  (Read 17012 times)
spallanzani
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« Reply #15 on: January 07, 2006, 01:38:14 AM »

It seems I frustrated some of you and I'm sorry because that's not what I intented to do. Indeed, I should have explained my point.

What I meant it directly taken from the final report:

Quote
2.2.5.3 Configuration Changes
At 1615:56, after recovery from the initial dive, the captain told the air traffic
controller that he wanted to “change my configuration, make sure I can control the jet and
I’d like to do that out here over the bay if I may.” As previously mentioned, the captain
then ordered extension of the slats at 1617:54 and the flaps at 1618:05. The captain did not
brief the first officer about what to expect or what to do if these configuration changes
resulted in excessive flight control pressures or loss of control of the airplane. Further, the
captain did not specify that the flaps should be extended at a slower-than-normal rate,
which would have been a prudent precaution to minimize the possibility of the
configuration change causing abrupt airplane movements that could be difficult to control.
Nevertheless, at 1618:17, after the slats and flaps were extended, the captain noted that the
airplane was “pretty stable right here.” The captain added that the airspeed needed to
decrease to 180 KIAS (the airplane was then at 250 KIAS). Nine seconds later, at 1618:26,
the captain ordered retraction of the slats and flaps, and the airspeed began to subsequently
increase. It was not clear from the CVR recording why the captain ordered retraction of
the slats and flaps and allowed the airspeed to increase nor did the CVR recording indicate
any discussion about the possible effects of the slat and flap extension.
The Safety Board notes that an airplane with flight control problems should be
handled in a slow and methodical manner and that any configuration that would aid a
landing should be maintained if possible. On the basis of the captain’s comment, the
airplane was stable after the slat and flap extension at 1618:05. This configuration would
have aided the approach and landing process. The Safety Board concludes that flight
crews dealing with an in-flight control problem should maintain any configuration change
that would aid in accomplishing a safe approach and landing, unless that configuration
change adversely affects the airplane’s controllability.


I know pilots were under pressure and they certainly did their best. I fully understand that. But when we look at the situation, we are able to analyse everything and see what went wrong and what went right.

I thought we could have talked about the analysis of the event but it seems it's not the case, so I think I will shout my mouth now.
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ZOTAN
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« Reply #16 on: January 07, 2006, 12:38:05 PM »

Quote from: ZOTAN
Quote from: spallanzani
but pilots should have followed: land as soon as possible and do not change the airplane configuration if everything's working fine.


Unless you have a type rating in an MD-80 and thousands of hours, you shouldn't be talking. Both of these pilots were very experienced and did everything they could.
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Matt Stevens
digger
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« Reply #17 on: January 07, 2006, 01:26:02 PM »

Quote
Unless you have a type rating in an MD-80 and thousands of hours, you shouldn't be talking. Both of these pilots were very experienced and did everything they could.


I think you guys are being too hard on spallanzani, particularly in light of the excerpt he quoted above. His initial comment on changing the aircraft configuration might have seemed out of line at the time, lacking any greater context, but in light of the quoted excerpt, it does not seem to me to be an unreasonable springboard for further discussion.

I doubt there's anyone here who has any hours in an MD-80 at all, and for those that may, I'm sure the lessons that can be learned have been been discussed already, in other, more professionally oriented venues.

That being said, I don't think it's out of bounds to discuss the accident, and the results of the investigation here. Most of us may not bring thousads of hours of in-type, or on-position experience to *any* of these discussions, but I think there exists the potential for any of us to learn *something* useful, or to refine or broaden our points of view, simply through the exchange of ideas.
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Fryy
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« Reply #18 on: January 07, 2006, 03:07:01 PM »

Well said.
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davolijj
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« Reply #19 on: January 07, 2006, 04:51:27 PM »

Quote from: digger
...That being said, I don't think it's out of bounds to discuss the accident, and the results of the investigation here. Most of us may not bring thousads of hours of in-type, or on-position experience to *any* of these discussions, but I think there exists the potential for any of us to learn *something* useful, or to refine or broaden our points of view, simply through the exchange of ideas.


I have to agree with Digger on this one.  At the same time we should all try to avoid making "Monday morning quarterback" statements.
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JD
n57flyguy
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« Reply #20 on: January 10, 2006, 04:58:30 PM »

davolijj and digger, well said. I really don't know what to say about his dissicion weather or not they should have changed the airplanes config and really can't say anything because I don't know what was going on inside the cockpit. We all know what happens when we assume. But, we all should just try not to make such broad statments, Ive done it and looked like a fool.
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spallanzani
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« Reply #21 on: January 10, 2006, 06:08:49 PM »

As I said, I just wanted to report what was established in the final report. The accident was studied and NTSB issued that statement. I should have said that I was reporting from the final report - that is what I've done in my second post. I'm sorry again and I hope I will be forgiven.
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n57flyguy
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« Reply #22 on: January 11, 2006, 10:06:43 AM »

Youll be forgiven. This whole thing is really confusing. Let me get this strait, he went into a dive at FL26 boxed FL 15 to FL 24 then change the config into flaps and  slates down leveled out, then brought them up, inverted and hit the water. Im probably missing some stuff though. But
spallanzani, NTSB dosn't know why they changed the configuration either , but hey did it for a reason that only the piolts knew and it wasn't on the CVR, so we willl never know what happened and why the airplanes config was changed. I now do see what your coming from though so don't take it personally, and you'll be forgiven, it was just a mistake.
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