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Author Topic: Pilatus PC-12 crash  (Read 19451 times)
ORD Don
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« on: June 11, 2012, 04:08:40 PM »





          I found some audio from KFPR in Fort Pierce, Fl. of the ill-fated plane taking off.  The clip is edited.  God rest their souls.....
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notaperfectpilot
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« Reply #1 on: June 11, 2012, 04:38:55 PM »

 cry

here is that track log from FlightAware..never good when any plane goes down...

http://flightaware.com/live/flight/N950KA/history/20120607/1530Z/KFPR/3JC/tracklog

 cry cry
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rmarrese
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« Reply #2 on: June 11, 2012, 11:06:21 PM »

The Flight Aware tract weather image shows the end of the flight in good weather. 
Remember the Nexrad images can take from 5-20 minutes to assemble.  What you see is not what you get.

Stored Nexrad images at the time of the accident may provide more info.   

They got into a cell at FL 260.

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englishpilot
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« Reply #3 on: June 12, 2012, 09:13:37 AM »

Here is the spec sheet for this aircraft:

http://westair.com/images/inventory/SN730%20Spec%20Sheet.web.pdf
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I don't proclaim to be the best pilot in the world but I'm safe.
notaperfectpilot
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« Reply #4 on: June 12, 2012, 09:20:30 AM »


wow, quite an airplane!
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martyj19
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« Reply #5 on: June 12, 2012, 12:25:27 PM »

wow, quite an airplane!

In my view the most impressive thing about the PC-12 is that, being single engine, it has a stall speed in landing configuration of 60kt.  Thus it can get into amazingly short runways.
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svoynick
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« Reply #6 on: June 25, 2012, 02:34:00 PM »

Just an operational note - and feel free to tell me if this is "too soon" for critique, given that it's a fatal accident scenario (but this forum is about ATC communications...):  did anyone else find it notable that his radio procedure was a little loose?  Except in his initial calls to ground and center and his "ready to taxi" call, he never used his acft ID in responding to ATC? 

(In fairness, it sounds like the beginning of his readback may have been cut off, either by a feed scanner, or in the editing or something...)
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dlbcrjpilot
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« Reply #7 on: June 25, 2012, 10:02:35 PM »

Loose or not... has no merit on what happens if he indeed hit a cell at FL260 IMO
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dljone3
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« Reply #8 on: June 26, 2012, 02:38:55 PM »

Just an operational note - and feel free to tell me if this is "too soon" for critique, given that it's a fatal accident scenario (but this forum is about ATC communications...):  did anyone else find it notable that his radio procedure was a little loose?  Except in his initial calls to ground and center and his "ready to taxi" call, he never used his acft ID in responding to ATC? 

(In fairness, it sounds like the beginning of his readback may have been cut off, either by a feed scanner, or in the editing or something...)

I would have to agree with you on that one. Not sure how much time the pilot had, but I imagine it's at least a few hundred hours if he's flying a PC-12. One would expect better comms from a pilot with that amount of time.
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svoynick
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« Reply #9 on: June 27, 2012, 03:16:57 AM »

Loose or not... has no merit on what happens if he indeed hit a cell at FL260 IMO
Perhaps not, considered in isolation, but a loose approach and casual adherence to flight prodecures in general - if the loose comms are a "tip of the iceberg" type of indicator - would erode other safety margins that may have related to keeping the aircraft from punching into that cell in the first place...
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jkenney
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« Reply #10 on: July 11, 2012, 02:59:40 PM »

I did not find his comm procedures to be "loose".  They sounded pretty normal, definitely not as crisp as a two person professional crew but his readbacks were reasonably concise and correct. 

What I did find disturbing is that he queries the controller for the Lakeland VOR identifier once he is climbing.   Given his clearance was "radar vectors Lakeland",  it should already be in his NAV system, knowing that when you are being radar vectored to a fix at some point to usually get direct to that fix.

It seems to imply to me that he was in a hurry.   After his clearance he asks for about 1 minute before taxiing.   It takes me a lot longer than that to set up my various comms and NAV systems. Granted this was a pretty simple clearance, but the fact that he asked the controller for the Lakeland identifier is a huge tell in my mind.

I suspect after having flown from the Bahamas and gone through customs, which was probably a pain, he had "get home-itis", exacerbated by the fact he was traveling with his entire family.   In his hurry to get off the ground and get home he probably launched without his NAV systems fully configured, planning to catch up once airborne.   Once airborne he became pre-occupied with getting the NAV systems set up and did not focus on the growing convective weather threat.

It's a terrible tragedy, the PC-12 is a great plane and those who have owned them seem to agree that they are very well built machines.  Unfortunately when aircraft get into it with thunderstorms they rarely win.
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InterpreDemon
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« Reply #11 on: July 11, 2012, 04:27:54 PM »

Here's a link to the NTSB preliminary report. Looks like a typical "spiral out of the clouds" scenario to me, perhaps brought on by pitot ice (ASI failure) or cabin decompression. They are cleared to climb from 24k to 25k and turn right to avoid weather. At one point after the turn they descend about 12,000 feet in just 36 seconds, possibly an intentional dive to breathable air at greater than VNE, blowing past the Barber Pole, resulting in irrecoverable control flutter and subsequent failure or a panic pull-out with structural failure.

http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20120607X54234&key=1

Should be interesting to see the final report. My money is on sudden decompression, the pilot then unable to get on oxygen and/or entering into an excessive, terminal dive to save his family members who under ordinary circumstances would have had three to five minutes of consciousness even if remaining at 25,000 feet.
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KJFK ARINC
KHPN ATIS
(KJFK) NY DEP Liberty East
HF CAR-A  3455/5550/6577/8846/11396
HF ARINC LDOC  6640/8933
HF NY VOLMET  6604

Complaints should be addressed to: City Hall
cphillips103
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« Reply #12 on: July 21, 2012, 09:19:46 AM »

I don't see the conversation as being loose. sounded normal to me. yes. some things are normally sticking to the radio format, climb to 9,000, level at such and such, but when asking things slightly off the routine like what's the identifier of a particular airport, things usually become a little bit more casual. If you listen to LiveAtc at any of the Class Bravo's you'll hear rapid fire conversations within format, but occasionally a pilot will ask something more conversationally like we just missed such and such taxiway can you turn us around?

Anybody have a link for the conversation while they were at flight levels?

-CP
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Robert Larson
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« Reply #13 on: July 22, 2012, 10:51:41 AM »

I agree with cphillips103 comment. To expand a bit: AIM 4-2-1.b does specify that "The single, most important thought in pilot-controller communications is understanding....Since concise phraseology may not always be adequate, use whatever words are necessary to get your message across."   Sometimes referred to as using "Plain English". The FARs do not require use of correct phraseology and techniques. Use whatever method is needed to ensure clear understanding.
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svoynick
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« Reply #14 on: July 24, 2012, 03:10:19 PM »

I agree with cphillips103 comment. To expand a bit: AIM 4-2-1.b does specify that "The single, most important thought in pilot-controller communications is understanding....Since concise phraseology may not always be adequate, use whatever words are necessary to get your message across."   Sometimes referred to as using "Plain English". The FARs do not require use of correct phraseology and techniques. Use whatever method is needed to ensure clear understanding.
I think I didn't make myself clear - ironic, since I'm commenting on a communication issue!

My issue is not at all with minor phraseology issues, but with his complete lack of identifying his aircraft in most of his clearance readbacks and responses to ATC.  That's a habit that is successfully trained into pilots from 30-hour students going out on their first solo to 5000 hour ATPs.  There are reasons for it, and reasons that it needs to be a habit.  

To me, it's also an indicator that a pilot understands that lots of little things have their places in the bigger system in which he is operating, and lots of those little things all add together within that system to enhance the safety of flight.

You can excuse it by saying that the frequency and airspace weren't particularly busy, but then what's the point of training important procedures (like clearly ID'ing your aircraft on radio comms) to become habits?  The point is that you want them to be there - automatically - when things get a little tighter, like when you are in congested airspace, or when there's another aircraft with a callsign close to yours on frequency.

To be clear:  I'm not suggesting that the communication issues I'm talking about had anything specific to do with the outcome of this flight.  I'm wondering - admittedly without solid evidence - whether the lax comm procedures (indicated in my mind not by particular phraseology, but by the lack of ID'ing readbacks) might be an indicator of loose habits or procedures in other areas of how the flight was conducted.

In short, I'm not screaming out that I think there's a smoking gun - just saying, "Hmmm, I wonder about this..."
« Last Edit: July 24, 2012, 06:02:25 PM by svoynick » Logged
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