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Author Topic: US Airways 1549 Audio.  (Read 60874 times)
sunburn
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« on: February 05, 2009, 10:30:04 AM »

http://www.faa.gov/data_statistics/accident_incident/1549/

Been released today.

All audio and transcripts are on the link.
« Last Edit: February 05, 2009, 10:32:32 AM by sunburn » Logged
eppy
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« Reply #1 on: February 05, 2009, 01:01:52 PM »

 sad Thanks very much for the links, but wish the techies at FAA would understand that radio recordings are 'lo-fi' and can be saved as MP3 at low bit rate/file size. The recordings are ENOURMOUS.

They should look at LiveATC.net for best practice on how to do it  grin
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englishpilot
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« Reply #2 on: February 05, 2009, 01:33:13 PM »

sad Thanks very much for the links, but wish the techies at FAA would understand that radio recordings are 'lo-fi' and can be saved as MP3 at low bit rate/file size. The recordings are ENOURMOUS.

They should look at LiveATC.net for best practice on how to do it  grin


Matey, you're talking about America.  Bigger's always better, right?!
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« Reply #3 on: February 05, 2009, 01:36:31 PM »

You can pick up the flight at 6:18 of the first clip (2025:51 according to the transcript) when cleared from 7 to 1500.
The brid strike call comes in about 7:56 into the clip (2027:36 transcript).
« Last Edit: February 05, 2009, 01:39:49 PM by ckleitsch » Logged
athaker
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« Reply #4 on: February 05, 2009, 02:08:09 PM »

The cab audio also has a lot of action.  Gives you an idea of how many different people, airports, and services coordinated this emergency
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wannafly
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« Reply #5 on: February 05, 2009, 03:34:01 PM »

Here is a composite, starting with ATIS up through loss of communication.  My first post and edit here, but I've enjoyed everyone else's posts for quite some time.  Glad to finally be able to post something.

* Cactus1549Composite.mp3 (2092.09 KB - downloaded 3928 times.)
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SkanknTodd
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« Reply #6 on: February 05, 2009, 08:45:25 PM »

on the cab coordinator tapes, the coordinator ends several communications with other people by saying "mike whiskey."  anyone know what that means?
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w0x0f
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« Reply #7 on: February 05, 2009, 09:21:33 PM »

operating initials.  required when ending landline coordination.
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Yegger
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« Reply #8 on: February 06, 2009, 11:00:26 AM »

Cab coordinator is chilling audio.

* cactuscabaudio.mp3 (8020.45 KB - downloaded 4400 times.)
« Last Edit: February 06, 2009, 11:35:55 AM by Adrian8 » Logged
djmodifyd
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« Reply #9 on: February 06, 2009, 03:57:59 PM »

operating initials.  required when ending landline coordination.

correct...although why he doesn't say "MW" i don't know
i just say "DJ"

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mkop
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« Reply #10 on: February 07, 2009, 11:54:40 PM »

Why were only some of the landline communciations ended this way? (Unless I missed something, but I specifically noticed that.)
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w0x0f
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« Reply #11 on: February 08, 2009, 01:29:42 AM »

Why were only some of the landline communications ended this way? (Unless I missed something, but I specifically noticed that.)

Just my guess, but they had more important things to be concerned with than saying operating initials.  I can tell you from experience, you eliminate unimportant tasks when time is of the essence and lives are at stake. 

Stating operating initials can be eliminated on intrafacility coordination if certain technology is available.  It is still required on interfacility coordination.

This controller did a helluva job doing all of his own coordination with LGA and TEB under extraordinary circumstances.  N90 is critically staffed and can't always open the handoff positions which normally would do such coordination.  He was rewarded immediately after this by the FAA with a drug test.  I'm sure the FAA will also make note of the nonstandard phraseology, incorrect callsigns, although AWE 1549 answered each time, and the absence of operating initials on the landline calls to LGA and TEB.  That's the kind of appreciation he gets from his employer.

NATCA should nominate him for the Archie League Award. 

w0x0f 
« Last Edit: February 08, 2009, 01:33:02 AM by w0x0f » Logged
BWilliams
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« Reply #12 on: February 09, 2009, 10:41:26 AM »

Here is a composite, starting with ATIS up through loss of communication.  My first post and edit here, but I've enjoyed everyone else's posts for quite some time.  Glad to finally be able to post something.

Amazing ... CNN actually used a cut-down version of this composite for their broadcast. ( http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/05/1549.voice.recorder.tape/ )

I thought it sounded extremely familiar, and I listened to both at the same time, and the timing is right on between the transmissions, except for where they cut out certain sections.

Nice work, wannafly!
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djmodifyd
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« Reply #13 on: February 09, 2009, 07:16:24 PM »

Why were only some of the landline communications ended this way? (Unless I missed something, but I specifically noticed that.)

Just my guess, but they had more important things to be concerned with than saying operating initials.  I can tell you from experience, you eliminate unimportant tasks when time is of the essence and lives are at stake. 

Stating operating initials can be eliminated on intrafacility coordination if certain technology is available.  It is still required on interfacility coordination.

This controller did a helluva job doing all of his own coordination with LGA and TEB under extraordinary circumstances.  N90 is critically staffed and can't always open the handoff positions which normally would do such coordination.  He was rewarded immediately after this by the FAA with a drug test.  I'm sure the FAA will also make note of the nonstandard phraseology, incorrect callsigns, although AWE 1549 answered each time, and the absence of operating initials on the landline calls to LGA and TEB.  That's the kind of appreciation he gets from his employer.

NATCA should nominate him for the Archie League Award. 

w0x0f 
This is so true.  The FAA is just going to screw them....ive seen it before.

and i agree with Archie League Award full on
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athaker
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« Reply #14 on: February 09, 2009, 11:31:08 PM »

Why were only some of the landline communications ended this way? (Unless I missed something, but I specifically noticed that.)

Just my guess, but they had more important things to be concerned with than saying operating initials.  I can tell you from experience, you eliminate unimportant tasks when time is of the essence and lives are at stake. 

Stating operating initials can be eliminated on intrafacility coordination if certain technology is available.  It is still required on interfacility coordination.

This controller did a helluva job doing all of his own coordination with LGA and TEB under extraordinary circumstances.  N90 is critically staffed and can't always open the handoff positions which normally would do such coordination.  He was rewarded immediately after this by the FAA with a drug test.  I'm sure the FAA will also make note of the nonstandard phraseology, incorrect callsigns, although AWE 1549 answered each time, and the absence of operating initials on the landline calls to LGA and TEB.  That's the kind of appreciation he gets from his employer.

NATCA should nominate him for the Archie League Award. 

w0x0f 



Well stated. 

To put it more bluntly, the 160,000lb glider (I would hope) takes priority over minutiae.... this drug test business is ridiculous. I mean, look how fast these guys cleared airspace and pavement for the cactus...
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« Reply #15 on: February 10, 2009, 05:02:37 AM »

Well stated. 
To put it more bluntly, the 160,000lb glider (I would hope) takes priority over minutiae.... this drug test business is ridiculous. I mean, look how fast these guys cleared airspace and pavement for the cactus...

You guys seem to be making a big deal out of absolutely nothing.  The crew was drug tested as well after the incident.  That is standard procedure after any type of accident or incident, no matter what the reason or outcome was, no matter who or what is to blame.

Any commercial pilot (121, 135, or 91) is subject to random drug testing at any time anyway.  Did I enjoy pulling my airplane up to the gate after a 3+ hour flight, only to be met by someone holding a cup?  No.  But that is part of the job, like it or not.
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« Reply #16 on: February 10, 2009, 07:25:30 AM »

Well stated. 
To put it more bluntly, the 160,000lb glider (I would hope) takes priority over minutiae.... this drug test business is ridiculous. I mean, look how fast these guys cleared airspace and pavement for the cactus...

You guys seem to be making a big deal out of absolutely nothing.  The crew was drug tested as well after the incident.  That is standard procedure after any type of accident or incident, no matter what the reason or outcome was, no matter who or what is to blame.


Agreed...all par for the course especially in high profile incidents such as these. This isn't the FAA trying to setup a scape goat if the need arises. I'm not FAA cheerleader, but remember that they indemnify controllers for their actions on duty. So the FAA pays in a settlement even if a controller took 4 times the suggested dosage of sudafed for for taking position. In fact it would probably be in their best interest to no find out about such things. I think it's more of a DOT/NTSB thing though. Drug test are SOP train and ship related incidents as well.
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« Reply #17 on: February 11, 2009, 08:44:19 AM »

Well stated. 
To put it more bluntly, the 160,000lb glider (I would hope) takes priority over minutiae.... this drug test business is ridiculous. I mean, look how fast these guys cleared airspace and pavement for the cactus...

You guys seem to be making a big deal out of absolutely nothing.  The crew was drug tested as well after the incident.  That is standard procedure after any type of accident or incident, no matter what the reason or outcome was, no matter who or what is to blame.



I have to agree on this one.  There's no doubt the controller's, pilot, flight crew, and everyone else did an outstanding job.

But you can always learn and perform better.  I've worked in the Nuclear Power Industry where similar standards exist.  If an event happened in the plant, once it was over the first step was to walk through it again and see if it could have been handled better.  That's simply a fact of life when working in industries and positions that allow for no errors.  You don't work the job for the glory that comes from doing the job right.

The drug testing is also standard in many other industries.  A truck driver hauling hazardous materials that gets rear ended by a sleeping driver at a stop sign, will have to immediately fill a cup.  Its standard procedure.  Or as you aviators would say, "It's part of the checklist".  Operational Discipline dictates that the checklist gets done the same way, everytime.
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« Reply #18 on: February 11, 2009, 05:38:48 PM »

Very interesting feedback guys, I appreciate it.  I wasn't aware this was protocol built into the positions mentioned, and knowing that it wasn't just singling these guys out, it makes complete sense.

I guess a better way to convey my opinion is that I hope all the people involved get due credit.  In a time when our country is in financial and psychological despair, due highly to the negligence, irresponsibility, or misconduct of individuals, this event brings to light those people that are still working hard and achieving. 

This, right now, is when we need heroes.  The positive actions of these guys, even if it was part of the checklist or thanks to the training, can go a long way towards reminding everyone else what good people are still capable of. 
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« Reply #19 on: February 13, 2009, 03:38:47 PM »

Well stated. 
To put it more bluntly, the 160,000lb glider (I would hope) takes priority over minutiae.... this drug test business is ridiculous. I mean, look how fast these guys cleared airspace and pavement for the cactus...

You guys seem to be making a big deal out of absolutely nothing.  The crew was drug tested as well after the incident.  That is standard procedure after any type of accident or incident, no matter what the reason or outcome was, no matter who or what is to blame.

Any commercial pilot (121, 135, or 91) is subject to random drug testing at any time anyway.  Did I enjoy pulling my airplane up to the gate after a 3+ hour flight, only to be met by someone holding a cup?  No.  But that is part of the job, like it or not.

I have to respectfully disagree with you here.  Controllers are subject to random testing just like pilots, but it is up to FAA mangement to determine whether a controllers performance may have contributed to an accident or incident.

FAA Order 3910.1C states that "Only employees whose job performance at or about the time of an accident or incident provides reason to believe that such performance may have contributed to the accident or incident, or cannot be completely discounted as a contributing factor to the accident or incident, shall be determined to be subject to post-accident testing."  http://aviationmedicine.com/resources/files/PDF/FAA_Forms/Order3910.1CRevised_08_08_06.pdf

I am directly familiar with other accidents where deaths have occurred and the controllers performance was considered a non-factor and testing was not administered.  I'm sure the FAA mangers told this N90 controller that they were doing this to protect him, but I know whose rear end they were protecting.

Consider me old fashioned, but I still believe in the US Constitution and feel that reasonable suspicion is required before searching my body after an incident such as this where evidence indicates that controller performance was not a factor.

Drug tests piss me off.

w0x0f 

   
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« Reply #20 on: February 13, 2009, 06:17:42 PM »

Thanks for the audio.  The whole liveatc scanner enthusiast ring is great. 


Have you considered the possibility that 1549 never hit birds?  I'm not ATP, air traffic or associated with any segment of the airline industry, so any comment I say should not be construed as credible.  But the facts are what they are.   

This same aircraft and engine configuration endured a double high pressure compressor stall over Newark three days before landing in the Hudson.  The engines: CFM 56-5B with 5BQ software update are made by SNECMA and GE Aviation.  GE makes the compressor which have such a dismal track record of surge and stall failure that CFM and EADS issued emergency maintenance bulletins to subject all 56-5Bs to stringent compressor stall margin tests and replace any unit that failed. 

In December, 2008, an Air France 320 with CFM 56-5Bs double compressor stalled after takeoff from Tunisia.  In November, an Air New Zealand crashed in the Mediterraean off France for unexplained causes.  Throughout and prior to 2007 numerous worldwide operators reported CFM 56-5B compressor stalls.   

There's a mountain of evidence dating back to CFM-powered British Midlands Flight 092 that crashed just short of Kegworth, destructive vibrations that tore apart the low pressure compressor vanes in one engine before the crew accidentally shutdown the good engine, that CFM engines are over engineered ticking time bombs that sacrifice component weight and durability for power-to-weight and fuel mileage. 

Chesley Sullenberger, working the radios at the time, called mayday, stated aircraft callsign and the situation, but forgot to press the PTT. New York La Guardia Departure TRACON never heard the transmission. 

1549 was on the same Tower-instructed 360 heading climbing through 2800' to, upon Departure radar contact to 15,000', a 4nm straight line from wheels up, when whatever knocked out both engines happened.  Right here renders colliding with birds next to impossible.  That's asking two pairs of expert roving eyes to fly straight in to what they would've seen from miles off. 


Sullenberger's hesitant next transmission, with the 'aah' and 'uh' is a pilot bewildered by being instructed to fly heading 270 in a direction away from standard EOSID.  Asked to fly north of Manhattan instead of a 180 rebound around ORCHY back to rwy 22. He complies with the TRACON instruction while asserting his desire to return to La Guardia, though too late. 

The mystery is where the "Hit birds" came from? 

Waterfowl almost never fly at 2800' no less in a skein.  And even if they did, a seasoned crew would have a clear line of sight at any skein well above its typical regime and its sight and emergent situtation unmistakable.  Moreover, even if did defy all odds and hit a flock, it wouldn't knock out both engines at the exact same time and what happened.

Only electronics (or manual pilot input but the not the case here) do this. And the only factor that would cause ECM to shutdown the #2 engine simultaneously with #1 is sensors detecting grevious mechanical trouble, such as the GE Aviation designed HPC disintegrating in midair after application of low power setting, exactly as the emergency bulletins warned of.   

 



 
 

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sykocus
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« Reply #21 on: February 13, 2009, 07:30:19 PM »


1549 was on the same Tower-instructed 360 heading climbing through 2800' to, upon Departure radar contact to 15,000', a 4nm straight line from wheels up, when whatever knocked out both engines happened.  Right here renders colliding with birds next to impossible.  That's asking two pairs of expert roving eyes to fly straight in to what they would've seen from miles off. 

The two pair of eyes had their "hands full" flying the plane. They were IFR. They're eyes don't need to be outside the cockpit looking for traffic. They need to be in the plane watching the instruments and running checklist, and they probably were. Also consider the closing rate. At the stage in flight when the incident occurred they were probably going close to 200kts. That's almost 2 miles every 30 seconds.



Sullenberger's hesitant next transmission, with the 'aah' and 'uh' is a pilot bewildered by being instructed to fly heading 270 in a direction away from standard EOSID.  Asked to fly north of Manhattan instead of a 180 rebound around ORCHY back to rwy 22. He complies with the TRACON instruction while asserting his desire to return to La Guardia, though too late. 


How you are sure his ahh and uh are have nothing to do with the fact that he just lost both his engines? The 270 is issued before the controller is aware of the situation at which point the controller issues a 220 which parallels the runway. He then offers runways 13, 31 and 4 to the pilot which all get turned down.




Moreover, even if did defy all odds and hit a flock, it wouldn't knock out both engines at the exact same time and what happened.

Only electronics (or manual pilot input but the not the case here) do this. And the only factor that would cause ECM to shutdown the #2 engine simultaneously with #1 is sensors detecting grevious mechanical trouble, such as the GE Aviation designed HPC disintegrating in midair after application of low power setting, exactly as the emergency bulletins warned of.   


My emphasis added. You seem very sure of those statements, how is it that the NTSB doesn't seem share the same viewpoint?

All-in-all I'm most confused about the motive behind the cover up that you seem to be advocating. Sure GE has motive, but what about the crew and NTSB why would they be trying to cover up a mechanical problem especially when it would be such an easy scape goat given the track record of the engines.
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« Reply #22 on: February 13, 2009, 08:56:14 PM »

babble babble

Simcoe2, you make a good arguement.....except for the part where you make your arguement.  Let's dissect the pertinent aspects:

You said you don't believe they hit birds and it was a simultaneous double compressor surge.  What about the passengers who saw, heard, and smelled the birds.  What about the crew that saw, heard, and smelled the birds.  Or the bird remains that were found in the engines and all over the airframe.

You said the pilots would have seen the birds out there while they were on their departure roll.  How exactly are you supposed to see a bird 4 miles out?  Then later on be able to see and avoid a flock of birds closing at 200+ mph?

You said Sully never pushed the PTT when he reported the mayday/engine failure.  Uh, yes he did?  It's on the ATC tapes that are posted in this very forum.  The "mayday" portion was cut off by the controller giving them their initial left turn.

You said it would be impossible to knock out both engines at the same time.  I ask why?  Surely the engines did not flame out at precisely the same milisecond.  But both engines flying through the same flock of birds at the same time, yeah, they could be knocked offline within a second of each other.

You said the crew kept flying ATC's instructions after declaring mayday which seemed to be vectors away from the 22 final approach course, which I don't necessarily agree with.  They had departed runway 4, so a 22 return is out of the question.  Initially the controller offers 13, which would be the easiest quick return, but Sully knew instantly (he is also a glider pilot) that a return to LGA was out of the question.

I hate to say it, but just about every fact (opinion?) that you gave concerning this accident is just incorrect.
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« Reply #23 on: February 14, 2009, 06:36:17 PM »


How you are sure his ahh and uh are have nothing to do with the fact that he just lost both his engines? The 270 is issued before the controller is aware of the situation at which point the controller issues a 220 which parallels the runway. He then offers runways 13, 31 and 4 to the pilot which all get turned down.

The 270 turn instruction was issued at 20:27:32 Z by L116.  Four seconds later Sullenberger keyed the mic and declared "Hit birds."  I.e., instantly after L116's turn instruction.  Thus whatever happened occurred on the 360 heading while climbing to 15,000'.  And that's a straight shot. 




My emphasis added. You seem very sure of those statements, how is it that the NTSB doesn't seem share the same viewpoint?


The NTSB has no vested legal power to force any airline or manufacturer to do anything. 


All-in-all I'm most confused about the motive behind the cover up that you seem to be advocating. Sure GE has motive, but what about the crew and NTSB why would they be trying to cover up a mechanical problem especially when it would be such an easy scape goat given the track record of the engines.

Because the media create "heroes" to attract audiences.  The real heroes in this debacle were the flight attendants and ferry boats, with the first one reaching the left wing tip in a remarkable circa 4 minutes after splashdown.  The media made the pilots their chosen heroes when, in fact, if really did hit birds, were 100% at fault for losing all forward thrust and forcing the plane down.   

If you read the EADS and CFM bulletins, you'll see a different explanation that led to this forward thrust loss just as it did to the same plane three days before.  The motives by airline and component manufacturers to conceal flaws are as old as the industry itself and beyond.  It's human nature to conceal or maintain silence. In fact, the most pivotal design amendments to fatally flawed components were instigated by relatives of deceased passengers that literally stole the complicit evidence and manufacturer knoweldge of such from under the nose the culpable party(s).   
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« Reply #24 on: February 14, 2009, 07:30:40 PM »

babble babble

Simcoe2, you make a good arguement.....except for the part where you make your arguement.  Let's dissect the pertinent aspects:

You said you don't believe they hit birds and it was a simultaneous double compressor surge.  What about the passengers who saw, heard, and smelled the birds.  What about the crew that saw, heard, and smelled the birds.  Or the bird remains that were found in the engines and all over the airframe.

You said the pilots would have seen the birds out there while they were on their departure roll.  How exactly are you supposed to see a bird 4 miles out?  Then later on be able to see and avoid a flock of birds closing at 200+ mph?

You said Sully never pushed the PTT when he reported the mayday/engine failure.  Uh, yes he did?  It's on the ATC tapes that are posted in this very forum.  The "mayday" portion was cut off by the controller giving them their initial left turn.

You said it would be impossible to knock out both engines at the same time.  I ask why?  Surely the engines did not flame out at precisely the same milisecond.  But both engines flying through the same flock of birds at the same time, yeah, they could be knocked offline within a second of each other.

You said the crew kept flying ATC's instructions after declaring mayday which seemed to be vectors away from the 22 final approach course, which I don't necessarily agree with.  They had departed runway 4, so a 22 return is out of the question.  Initially the controller offers 13, which would be the easiest quick return, but Sully knew instantly (he is also a glider pilot) that a return to LGA was out of the question.

I hate to say it, but just about every fact (opinion?) that you gave concerning this accident is just incorrect.



Waterfowl ingested by a turbofan engine are converted to snarge in the blink of an eye.  A blood deposit, basically, splattered at high speed by still rotating fan blades, that's scraped off the engine's interior, placed in a bag, labelled and mailed to the NTSB for further study.  Pilots do not and cannot smell snarge, it being physically impossible, from the cockpit tens of feet away from the engines.  So let us scratch this dissection.

Bird strike remains stay on airframes in lesser regularity than humans hit by a car head on and knocked flying over the hood leave human remains on the car.  Only physical impact evidence typically remains, what with bleeding taking longer, and there's no physical evidence on any part of 1549 that any 8-10lb waterfowl collided with that aircraft as the photograph evidences indicates.   

Which passenger saw and heard a bird?  Would that be Mark Hood in 1st class (seat B1) who was chatting to female passenger to his immediate right in B2 at moment of engine failure? The trouble with this is that everybody else onboard heard a BOOM, consistent with a High Pressure Compressor surge like the same boom heard three days before.  Hood told the media that he was the second last to leave the stricken aircraft after Sullenberger, even gentlemanly offering Sullenberger "After you, sir!"  This contradicts his other statement of standing on the frigid wing for 10 minutes before rescued aboard a Hudson ferry.  Victims and purported eyewitnesses invent stories of fiction in the adrenaline-charged rush of media attention.  They claim to perform singular acts of altruistic heroism that never happened or could have.  And Hood is one.  Hood was fourth out that front left exit within seconds at flight attendant terse command and would've been thrown out by his ears had he not complied. Furthermore, people pay big bucks to fly 1st class to sleep in a dark, quiet, big comfortable seat. The odds of his window shade being open to see anything outside at the time are slim to none.  Once the boom, certainly.  Before, hugely unlikely.           
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