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Author Topic: Russian Jet Carrying Hockey Team Crashes, 43 Dead  (Read 16891 times)
joeyb747
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« on: September 07, 2011, 12:10:58 PM »

"MOSCOW –  A Russian jet carrying members of a local hockey team crashed shortly after takeoff on Wednesday, killing 43 people, including several former NHL players."

From:

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/09/07/36-dead-in-russian-airliner-crash/

"The team's coach is Canadian Brad McCrimmon, who took over in May. He was mosly recently an assistant coach with the Detroit Red Wings, and played 18 years in the NHL for Boston, Philadelphia, Detroit, Hartford and Phoenix."

From:

http://news.yahoo.com/russian-jet-carrying-hockey-team-crashes-43-dead-142501912.html
« Last Edit: September 07, 2011, 07:19:09 PM by joeyb747 » Logged

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joeyb747
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« Reply #1 on: September 07, 2011, 07:22:22 PM »

"A Yak Service Yakovlev Yak-42, registration RA-42434 performing a charter flight from Yaroslavl (Russia) to Minsk (Belarus) with 37 passengers (the Lokomotiv Yaroslav Hockey Team) and 8 crew, could not climb out after takeoff from Yaroslavl's Tunoshna Airport at approx. 15:50L (11:50Z). The airplane impacted an antenna outside the airport perimeter, impacted ground and came to rest about 1000 meters from the airport broken up in two major parts, the tail section at the bank of Volga River and the fuselage in the river. 26 bodies have so far been recovered, two occupants have been taken to hospitals with critical injuries."

From:

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4428da13&opt=0
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joeyb747
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« Reply #2 on: September 07, 2011, 07:36:53 PM »

"“The team is feeling pretty down after hearing what happened this morning,” a somber Nicklas Lidstrom said, referring to news that former assistant coach and defensemen Brad McCrimmon, defenseman Ruslan Salei, and goalie Stefan Liv were aboard when the tragedy occurred."

From:

http://redwings.nhl.com/club/news.htm?id=587887
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ORD Don
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« Reply #3 on: September 12, 2011, 09:45:08 AM »






                 Has anybody seen or heard anything about possible causes ?
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joeyb747
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« Reply #4 on: September 12, 2011, 08:08:00 PM »

"Both survivors were flown to Moscow for treatment of the burns. While the flight engineer is on the way to recovery, the burns of Alexander Galimov proved "incompatible with life". The research hospital confirmed he died in the morning of Sep 12th."

"On Sep 12th 2011 the MAK reported, that the on site investigation has been nearly completed. The aircraft, built in 1993, had accumulated 6,500 flying hours, with a design target of 12,000 hours life span. The actual takeoff weight was below maximum takeoff weight. Total fuel on board was 14 tons, 8 tons of which were added in Yaroslavl. An analysis of the fuel is still being carried out. The crew performed a proper flight controls check during takeoff preparation, the elevator moved freely and normally. Weather conditions, including winds, had no influence on the accident sequence. Stabilizer and flaps were properly set for takeoff. All engines were working normally until impact with ground. A single parameter can not be identified as cause from the flight data recorder, all of the system parameters off the flight data recorder are now going to be studied in a special research center. The commission is considering a full scale experiment on the aircraft controls."


From the updated AvHerald Article.

So, to paraphrase, the aircraft was not over-weight, did not suffer fuel starvation, and thus far appeared to have properly functioning flight controls. Weather was good. And the engines appeared to be running at the time of the crash. Hopefully, the flight engineer, who is now the lone survivor, can shed some light on the incident at some point.
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ORD Don
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« Reply #5 on: September 13, 2011, 12:43:44 AM »






                     Thank you, sir...
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joeyb747
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« Reply #6 on: September 13, 2011, 02:44:55 PM »

                     Thank you, sir...

Wish I had more information to share...
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Fryy
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« Reply #7 on: September 13, 2011, 05:02:20 PM »

Not a good summer for hockey at all. Suicides, plane crashes, over doses. Geez.
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sever
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« Reply #8 on: September 13, 2011, 09:54:18 PM »

Alex Galimov (the goalkeeper of an ice-hockey team ) has died in hospital after air-crash.
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joeyb747
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« Reply #9 on: September 14, 2011, 07:55:56 AM »

Alex Galimov (the goalkeeper of an ice-hockey team ) has died in hospital after air-crash.

"Both survivors were flown to Moscow for treatment of the burns. While the flight engineer is on the way to recovery, the burns of Alexander Galimov proved "incompatible with life". The research hospital confirmed he died in the morning of Sep 12th."

This is from the updated AvHerald article. That makes the death toll 44, leaving only the flight engineer as a survivor.
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joeyb747
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« Reply #10 on: September 21, 2011, 03:03:48 PM »

"Late Sep 17th the MAK reported that before beginning the takeoff run the flaps and slats were set at 20 degrees and both slats and flaps had correctly extended into their commanded positions, the stabilizer trim was set to 8.7 degrees nose up corresponding with the CG at about 24-25% MAC. The crew cross checked all flight controls while taxiing out to taxiway 5, the elevator deflected to 21 degrees corresponding to its normal mechanical stop. The cross checks concluded 100 seconds before beginning the takeoff run. The aircraft entered the runway at intersection with taxiway 5 leaving a takeoff distance available of about 2700 meters. Takeoff commenced at nominal takeoff thrust, acceleration up to 165 kph (89 knots) was normal and consistent with engine's takeoff thrust. Rotation was initiated at about 185 kph (100 knots), the elevator was deflected to about 9-10 degrees (about half way travel), however the aircraft did not rotate. About 6 seconds later the engines were firewalled to deliver maximum takeoff thrust. Despite engines accelerated to maximum takeoff thrust, acceleration of the aircraft slowed significantly, possibly by the appearance of some additional braking force which needs to be determined mathematically. The aircraft reached a maximum speed of 230 kph (124 knots), the aircraft became airborne 400 meters past the end of the runway at an elevator deflection of 13-14 degrees and retrim to 9.5 degrees nose up. Immediately after becoming airborne the aircraft collided with the localizer antenna, the pitch angle increased to 20 degrees for 2-3 seconds, the aircraft reached a maximum height of 5-6 meters (15-18 feet). The aircraft sharply rolled to the left and impacted ground. Checks of the wreckage showed, that the elevator trim had reached 10 degrees nose up, the control wires had not been severed until time of impact. The investigation is currently looking into what may have caused the braking forces."

From the updated AvHerald article:

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4428da13&opt=0
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joeyb747
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« Reply #11 on: September 27, 2011, 02:52:06 PM »

"On Sep 23rd 2011 the MAK reported the surviving flight engineer told the MAK that the luggage was loaded into the rear cargo bay, the coaches and officials of the team were in the front cabin and the players in the second cabin. There had been no objections regarding the technical condition of the aircraft during the previous and before the accident flight."

Again, from the updated AvHerald article:

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4428da13&opt=0
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joeyb747
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« Reply #12 on: November 02, 2011, 10:28:56 AM »

Final Report has been released...

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4428da13/0014&opt=0
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derekjackson
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« Reply #13 on: November 02, 2011, 11:35:57 AM »

Wow. Very interesting and chilling, especially the part about the phenobarbitol.

One thing I don't quite understand is the following: Had the crew rejected takeoff even above V1, with about 1000 meters of runway remaining available after the failed first attempt to rotate the aircraft, an accident would have been averted.

This doesn't make sense to me because V1, by definition, means that you can not stop the plane safely with the amount of runway remaining, and V1 calculations take into account runway length, weather conditions, plane weight and so forth. Any ideas?
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RidersOnTheStorm
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« Reply #14 on: November 02, 2011, 12:40:35 PM »

Sad reading investigation report:

 - serious shortcomings in the re-training of the crew members  - Lack of supervision of the re-training

- errors and missed procedures by the crew in preparation and execution of the takeoff

(especially a wrong position of the foot on the brake pedal on the Yak-42 and
the captain, conducting a balanced takeoff, took the incompetent decision to begin the takeoff roll not from the beginning of the runway.)

- inconsistent, uncoordinated actions by the crew in the final stages of the takeoff

as for barbiturates in the First Officer, 'nuff said  shocked

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NoMad
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« Reply #15 on: November 06, 2011, 09:49:42 PM »

One thing I don't quite understand is the following: Had the crew rejected takeoff even above V1, with about 1000 meters of runway remaining available after the failed first attempt to rotate the aircraft, an accident would have been averted.

This doesn't make sense to me because V1, by definition, means that you can not stop the plane safely with the amount of runway remaining, and V1 calculations take into account runway length, weather conditions, plane weight and so forth. Any ideas?

Because that is not what V1 means at all.  V1 is the speed at which you decided to takeoff or reject and should be within the accelerate to stop distance.  It does not mean it is the end of your accelerate to stop distance, completely the opposite actually.  Consequently it also is the minimum speed required to take off if you lose an engine.
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derekjackson
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« Reply #16 on: November 07, 2011, 08:37:43 AM »

One thing I don't quite understand is the following: Had the crew rejected takeoff even above V1, with about 1000 meters of runway remaining available after the failed first attempt to rotate the aircraft, an accident would have been averted.

This doesn't make sense to me because V1, by definition, means that you can not stop the plane safely with the amount of runway remaining, and V1 calculations take into account runway length, weather conditions, plane weight and so forth. Any ideas?

Because that is not what V1 means at all.  V1 is the speed at which you decided to takeoff or reject and should be within the accelerate to stop distance.  It does not mean it is the end of your accelerate to stop distance, completely the opposite actually.  Consequently it also is the minimum speed required to take off if you lose an engine.

I'm sorry but could you please go over that again? It didn't make sense to me. Yes, I understand V1 is the decision speed beyond which you can not reject the takeoff with the amount of runway remaining. So how can in this case rejecting takeoff above V1 avert an accident? Could you also please go over what you mean by the "end of accelerate to stop distance?
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NoMad
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« Reply #17 on: November 07, 2011, 09:13:30 AM »

One thing I don't quite understand is the following: Had the crew rejected takeoff even above V1, with about 1000 meters of runway remaining available after the failed first attempt to rotate the aircraft, an accident would have been averted.

This doesn't make sense to me because V1, by definition, means that you can not stop the plane safely with the amount of runway remaining, and V1 calculations take into account runway length, weather conditions, plane weight and so forth. Any ideas?

Because that is not what V1 means at all.  V1 is the speed at which you decided to takeoff or reject and should be within the accelerate to stop distance.  It does not mean it is the end of your accelerate to stop distance, completely the opposite actually.  Consequently it also is the minimum speed required to take off if you lose an engine.

I'm sorry but could you please go over that again? It didn't make sense to me. Yes, I understand V1 is the decision speed beyond which you can not reject the takeoff with the amount of runway remaining. So how can in this case rejecting takeoff above V1 avert an accident? Could you also please go over what you mean by the "end of accelerate to stop distance?


Because once again, that is is NOT what V1 means at all.  Remove that thought from your head.

V1 is the speed at which the crew makes the decision to continue the takeoff or reject the takeoff.  It is the speed at which the aircraft must reach to continue the takeoff with an engine failure.  This speed should be reached within the accelerate-to-stop distance.  It does NOT mean that going faster or further puts you outside the accelerate-to-stop distance.
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derekjackson
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« Reply #18 on: November 07, 2011, 11:23:43 AM »

Okay so if I'm understanding this correctly, then the "guaranteed runway overrun" past V1 is a misconception and TV shows like Mayday are getting it wrong (either as an oversimplification or by not understanding it themselves).

But if that's the case, then what you're saying is that in some cases it is possible to reject takeoff with runway remaining past V1. If that's so, then why continue with takeoff if an engine goes out? I know that airplanes can takeoff and climb with an engine out and return and land safely but if there's enough runway left, wouldn't rejecting the takeoff still be preferable? Sorry for the barrage of questions.
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notaperfectpilot
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« Reply #19 on: November 07, 2011, 11:28:21 AM »

"V1 is the critical engine failure recognition speed or takeoff decision speed. It is the decision speed nominated by the pilot which satisfies all safety rules, and above which the takeoff will continue even if an engine fails. The speed will vary between aircraft types and also due to aircraft weight, runway length, wing flap setting, engine thrust used, runway surface contamination and other factors.

V1 is defined differently in different jurisdictions:
The US Federal Aviation Administration defines it as: V1 means the maximum speed in the takeoff at which the pilot must take the first action (e.g., apply brakes, reduce thrust, deploy speed brakes) to stop the airplane within the accelerate-stop distance. V1 also means the minimum speed in the takeoff, following a failure of the critical engine at VEF, at which the pilot can continue the takeoff and achieve the required height above the takeoff surface within the takeoff distance.

Transport Canada defines it as: Critical engine failure recognition speed and adds: This definition is not restrictive. An operator may adopt any other definition outlined in the aircraft flight manual (AFM) of TC type-approved aircraft as long as such definition does not compromise operational safety of the aircraft."


from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V_speeds
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derekjackson
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« Reply #20 on: November 07, 2011, 11:32:38 AM »

I found this document on the FAA website that is helping. It says the definition of V1 consists of two separate concepts:

1) V1 is the maximum speed at which the rejected takeoff maneuver can be initiated and the airplane stopped within the remaining field length under the conditions and procedures defined in the FARs. It is the latest point in the takeoff roll where a stop can be initiated. (this is how I was understanding it earlier)

2) V1 is also the earliest point from which an engine out takeoff can be continued and the airplane attain a height of 35 feet at the end of the runway. (this is how I think you are explaining it)

The FAA also states that "A No-go" decision after passing V1 will not leave sufficient runway remaining to stop if the takeoff weight is equal to the field length limit weight.

So the "run out of runway" scenario only applies in certain cases. Also, it says Do not attempt an RTO once the airplane has passed V1 ... ... this recommendation should prevail no matter what runway length appears to remain after V1

So perhaps in the case of the Yak crash, they may have had enough runway remaining but the V1 definition was based on an engine-out scenario (which of course was not the cause fo the accident).
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notaperfectpilot
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« Reply #21 on: November 07, 2011, 11:41:29 AM »

Also, it says Do not attempt an RTO once the airplane has passed V1 ... ... this recommendation should prevail no matter what runway length appears to remain after V1

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems to me from what that says, the crew did the RIGHT thing. Maybe I am not understanding it right. If that is the case, than why do they say that they should have RTO? 
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derekjackson
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« Reply #22 on: November 07, 2011, 12:19:26 PM »

Also, it says Do not attempt an RTO once the airplane has passed V1 ... ... this recommendation should prevail no matter what runway length appears to remain after V1

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems to me from what that says, the crew did the RIGHT thing. Maybe I am not understanding it right. If that is the case, than why do they say that they should have RTO? 

Hence my confusion.
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NoMad
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« Reply #23 on: November 07, 2011, 12:40:30 PM »

You can't base "right" vs "wrong" on simply whether or not they chose to reject after V1.  You have to evaluate your circumstances and make a decision.  MOST scenarios dictate not bothering to reject after V1 because the act of trying to stop is often more dangerous than continuing the takeoff with the given problem.  Those dangers include but are not limited to overrunning if you're beyond the stopping distance and the brakes catching on fire.  For example an engine failure is a serious problem but the plane can takeoff and fly without it.  The safest thing to do is continue the takeoff.

However, if the problem is such that continuing the takeoff will be more dangerous than trying to stop, than the safest course of action is to reject regardless of V1 or not.  Things such as "the plane is on fire" or perhaps "the plane isn't rotating and will never get off the ground".  Those situations are going to be rejects.  Most runways use by commercial aircraft will be long enough for most aircraft to not overrun anyway.  Maybe it will.  however I would rather slowly overrun and take out an antenna than keep trying to fly a plane that won't fly or that is on fire.
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derekjackson
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« Reply #24 on: November 07, 2011, 12:56:29 PM »

Ok, so in this case they happened to have enough runway remaining to stop and since they couldn't rotate the aircraft (meaning something was very wrong), rejecting takeoff after V1 could have led to a more favourable outcome.
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