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 51 
 on: January 24, 2015, 09:36:13 AM 
Started by masterkeymaster - Last post by AeroBill
Speaking about stuck mikes. They seem to be fairy common with aircraft radios. Don't they have an
indicator light or symbol on the radio to indicate the radio is transmitting even when it shouldn't be?
Or is it just a case of the pilot not noticing it until ground controller or other aircraft mentions there is
a stuck mike on the frequency?

 52 
 on: January 24, 2015, 08:23:37 AM 
Started by laylow - Last post by graemesmith
If there is one thing CONTINUES to bother me about this - it is the sensationalistic news reporting.  The latest being a statement by CBS News the other night that "The pilot pulled the plane up in a climb that was steeper than the plane was designed for"  (I paraphrase their report - but it was stated as a certitude).

No possibility that - "the plane MIGHT have been caught in the enormous updrafts associated with thunderstorm activity and exceeded its design load".  Far more probable than a pilot with thousands of hours flying the plane outside the envelope.  Let's face it - he had asked for a weather divert - looks like he got a mixture of unlucky (T/Storms are very tricky beasts to look into) and might have been a bit more assertive and said he WAS diverting for weather.

Sorry - thus endeth the rant - but I suspect this is not totally a pilot error.


 53 
 on: January 23, 2015, 03:46:47 PM 
Started by TangoWhiskey - Last post by Squawk 7700
I just ordered one.  smiley
Ken

 54 
 on: January 22, 2015, 11:32:11 PM 
Started by mk223 - Last post by InterpreDemon
Exactly, Tim, and I suspect that the TC heard Redwood clearly with but a low heterodyne from 526 underneath. AM reception does not have the "capture effect" that FM reception does (where a signal 3-6db stronger can "conquer" the limiter stage and effectively remove the weaker signal) which is why they still use it for aircraft... unless the difference between the two signals is overwhelming (12-15 db or more) and/or the transmitters are within less than, say 20hz frequency difference you are going to hear evidence of a blocked transmission. It is easily possible for these signal strength differences to occur on the field (despite all the signals being strong) due to larger relative inverse square differences in (the comparatively smaller) distance of the aircraft(s) from the field receiver than with a receiver that is 4-5 miles away (in the case of the LiveATC feed) or 8 miles away as my recordings were captured.

For all we know the TC heard Redwood just fine over top of 526 and, as I said before, could easily have assumed the double (if he heard it) was somebody who had just been handed off by APP trying to get a word in edgewise and who would doubtless try again anyway. 526, not hearing any dispute from the TC after reading back a routine and expected instruction, assumed their read back was correct and proceeded as they thought they had been instructed. The only other unknown is whether the missing instruction for 526 would have been forthcoming had not the event occurred, but it seems to me that would have been a bit later than usual, especially when you look at the actual elapsed time between when 526 was cleared to land (#2 following traffic on short final), when the Redwood instruction was given four minutes later (and 526 was clearly on the ground or at the very least least on short final), when 1295 was cleared to go almost a minute later and when the event occurred 30 seconds after that. So the way I look at it, even if 526 had correctly heard and ignored the Redwood instruction they still would not have received any instruction from the tower at the very least for a minute and a half after landing and possibly as many as three, which seems a bit odd to me, whereas the Redwood transmission would have occurred right about when I believe 526 would have been rolling out.

The slightest change in any of the factors would have made this a nil event... if it was Redwood niner-niner, if 1295 had been on-time, if the butterfly on Agent Starling's lips had been able to flap its wings, etc.

Shvt happens, that's all.

 55 
 on: January 22, 2015, 10:02:58 PM 
Started by mk223 - Last post by tim.landscheidt
To me it sounds like both voices read back the crossing clearance adding their distinct callsigns.  In any case, if the recording reflects what ATC actually heard, they should have detected the situation and proceeded with caution.  In the Tenerife airport disaster, (detectable) mangled radio transmissions were a major cause of the accident.

 56 
 on: January 22, 2015, 02:06:20 PM 
Started by mk223 - Last post by InterpreDemon
That's why these things get a postmortem from the experts, and as we all know when bad things happen it is usually due to multiple small errors or unfortunate coincidences. For example we do not know how the GC's receiver on the field heard the double read back to his redwood instruction... If redwood stepped clean on 526 (and he assumed any heterodyne was a handoff from APP who would try again) he still would have been deemed to have failed to properly communicate to 526 any taxi and handoff instructions. On the other hand if 526 stepped on redwood or both were unintelligible he failed to confirm the read back. The only failure I see on the part of 526 was taking the redwood instructions as those they were expecting (and had yet to receive) anyway. I have removed the exchange immediately prior to that instruction, the two were in rapid fire succession, and it's easy to imagine the pilots housekeeping on rollout hearing the "26" or even just a "6" and mistaking it for the expected, routine instruction.

As to the power of minor distractions I need not remind you of Eastern 401 that flew into the ground due to a burned out gear light and AdamAir 574 that fell into a graveyard spiral from cruise due to preoccupation with an inertial platform anomaly.

There's enough blame to go around in these types of things and the best we can do is try to learn from them.

 57 
 on: January 22, 2015, 01:32:53 PM 
Started by mk223 - Last post by keith
If there's a block, ATC usually hears it, too and usually says something like, "that was for <callsign> only," then repeats the instruction.

 58 
 on: January 22, 2015, 01:29:54 PM 
Started by mk223 - Last post by Rick108
I think she (Caribbean 526) heard the "FIF TEE SIX"  as  "FIFE TWO SIX" (the 'accent', you know!) and either missed or ignored the Redwood vs. Caribbean prefix.  She heard "526" and read back the taxi route (blocked) and was not corrected, so in her mind, she was ok.  That's all I can figure...

 59 
 on: January 22, 2015, 12:46:04 PM 
Started by swa4678 - Last post by swa4678
Just heard now on 134.2 (kvny_app feed) that AMF238 is requesting to talk to company about troubleshooting an unsafe gear indication. He's currently being given delay vectors and monitoring the frequency. Reported 1 soul onboard and I missed the fuel.

FlightAware link here.

 60 
 on: January 22, 2015, 12:26:45 PM 
Started by mk223 - Last post by swa4678
It's always fun to analyze these sort of things to death. On that note...

1) As you can see, 1295 had already been an extra load on the TC because he had a number of issues going on starting up his "cold airplane", thus drawing focus by the TC (paying more attention to this guys plight than the others on the conveyor belt).
Someone on the ground at KFJK isn't perfect and had to be given an altered taxi route??? Say it ain't so! rolleyes

While I don't doubt it's a nonzero amount of effort, I do doubt this "extra load" is really all that "extra" for a JFK cab controller. So he had to move the strip down a few slots in the bay, look around for a suitable holding spot in a movement area, and issue a few taxi instructions. If that was the beginning of the downfall of a JFK non-trainee... then may God help us all who fly into/through/out of KJFK.

2) I could not find any rollout instructions from the TC to Car 526... the last you hear is the TC giving 526 the landing clearance, which 526 reads back as 525.
Well yeah, he didn't give any extra instructions. But what's wrong with that?

Sounds like he heard Redwood's readback and then tried to get 1295 off the ground. Based in the gap in the transmissions, I'm guessing the distances led him to believe he had the time to fit the (already delayed) departure between the two arrivals without adding much more delay for anyone.

Seems reasonable to me to not solicit explicit hold short instructions from any aircraft exiting a parallel runway before issuing a takeoff clearance unless the arrival was previously given ambiguous instructions or an instruction to cross the runway. Otherwise, on feeds like LA South Tower, you'd hear things like "(ACID), runway 25R, taxi full length, hold short runway 25R" over, and over, and over again for every aircraft GC-2 transfers over.

Thus I believe the 526 pilot, expecting a rollout instruction, heard the instruction with a "six" as his and acknowledged making the same 525 vs 526 error he did with his landing clearance.
And this, IMHO, is strike #1 for the pilot who somehow made "RED WOOD FIF TEE SIX" sound like "CUH RIB BE UHN FI(F/V)E TUHWHEN TEE SIX" in his head.

The calls from the TC to 526 to "stop" as 1295 was on his takeoff roll were not heard because 526 had already switched to GND, which you will hear in the recording.
And this, IMHO, is strke #2 for the pilot who somehow decided it was good practice to leave the tower frequency before crossing an active runway with traffic apparently lined up (but in reality, rolling) on it.

The TC's transmission was given in a fairly logical order:
    1) Be alert for wake turbulence.
    2) Cross runway 22R at Juliet.
    3) Turn right onto Bravo.
    4) Monitor 121.9.

I get the desire to expeditiously get on the GC frequency in order to receive further taxi instructions ASAP. But why would that lead you to do #4 first (or second), i.e. before reaching (let alone crossing and clearing) an active runway? Not only that, why would you immediately leave tower's frequency (e.g. as opposed to tuning ground in COM2 and switching active COMs over to it) before doing so?

Conclusion: The TC dropped the ball handling the arrival of 526, probably because he was so excited about 1295 finally getting out of his hair.
It's interesting how the exact same facts/stipulations can lead to two conclusions on opposite ends of the spectrum. Mine, for example, is that the TC did almost everything short of sending a follow-me car out to meet the Caribbean at the runway in order to ensure a competent operator was doing the taxiing. He didn't do that, but he did keep a scan on the runway and eventually spotted the pilot's error.

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